Assistant Professor
(Starting from Fall 2025)
Ph.D., Cambridge University
Areas of Interest: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Meta-Ethics, Early Modern Philosophy, Early Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Well-Being
Personal Homepage: https://www.alexmoran.net/
Email: alex.moran@unifr.ch
Phone: tbd
Office: tbd
About
Alex Moran completed his PhD at the University of Cambridge in (2019). He also has a BA in Philosophy from University College London (2012) and a B. Phil in Philosophy from Oxford University (2014). Before the move to Bilkent, he was a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at the University of Oxford (2019-22) an IRC Research Fellow at Trinity College Dublin (2022-23), a visiting scholar at Princeton (2024), and an SNSF Research Fellow at the Université de Fribourg (2023-25). He is also a Research Associate at Stockholm University in connection with his project “Beyond Reductionism: Contingent Grounding and the Mind-Body Problem“.
Moran works mainly on topics in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, as well as on select topics in meta-ethics, the history of philosophy, and the philosophy of religion. His articles have appeared in such journals as the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophical Perspectives and several more. He’s also published co-authored and single-authored articles in various edited volumes with publishers like Oxford University Press and Bloomsbury, and has co-edited various special issues and volumes himself. He is currently writing his first academic book, The Doors of Perception: The Disclosive Nature of Sensory Experience, and is negotiating an advanced contract with Oxford University Press. He also has a trade book under contract with Reaktion Press entitled In Praise of Mischief, which offers a tongue-in-cheek philosophical analysis of mischief and trouble-making. Besides his academic writing, he’s published various non-academic pieces for general audiences including essays, interviews, and book reviews in places like the Times Literary Supplement, the Irish Times, Oxonian Review, Aeon and Psyche. When not writing philosophy, he reads literature voraciously: he has published poetry and is currently working on his first novel. He enjoys relaxing by playing the guitar or listening to music, and also likes to box.
Sample publications
Moran, A. & C. Rossi. (forthcoming). Objects and Properties: New Essays in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press.
Moran, A. (forthcoming). In Praise of Mischief (Reaktion Press).
Moran, A. (forthcoming). Does Negative Epistemic Disjunctivism Solve the Screening Off Problem? Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Moran, A. (forthcoming). Contingent Grounding Physicalism. Analytic Philosophy.
Moran, A. (2024). Disjunctivism and the Causal Conditions of Hallucination. Erkenntnis, 89, 129–152.
Moran, A. (2023). Grounding Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Perspectives: A Supplement to Noûs, 37 (1): 269-289.
Moran, A. (2023). Grounding Physicalism and “Moorean” Connections. Inquiry, October, 1–24.
Moran, A. (2022). Living Without Microphysical Supervenience. Philosophical Studies, 179(1): 405-428.
Moran, A. (2022). Memory Disjunctivism: A Causal Theory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 13, 1097–1117 (Second-place runner-up in the Philosophy of Memory Essay Prize hosted by the Centre for the Philosophy of Memory at the Institute de Philosophie de Grenoble.)
Moran, A. (2021). Grounding the Qualitative: A New Challenge for Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 28 (9/10): 163-180.
Moran, A. (2019). Naïve Realism, Hallucination, Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 27(2): 368-382.
Moran, A. (2019). Naïve Realism, Seeing Stars, and Perceiving the Past. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97(2): 368-382.
Moran, A. (2018). The Paradox of Decrease and Dependent Parts. Ratio, 31(3): 273-284.
Moran, A. (2018). Kind-Dependent Grounding. Analytic Philosophy, 59(3): 359-390.