Is Aristotelian character virtue a non-rational state?
By Dan Wolt (Bilkent, Philosophy)
Date: Tuesday January 5, 2021
Time: 1330-1500 (GMT+3)
This is an online event. All are welcome. If you would like to listen to the talk please click on the following link when the event is due to begin.
Zoom link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85898418318?pwd=RGRTQmMycUI5THZyN3VCRUg0eEpkdz09
Meeting ID: 858 9841 8318
Passcode: 872642
Abstract: It is widely believed that for Aristotle virtue of character is a purely non-rational state: a disposition to feel certain emotions in certain ways in certain circumstances and react accordingly. This presents both philosophical and textual challenges; the idea is implausible on its face, and it is hard to reconcile with some of Aristotle’s own comments about virtue of character. In this essay I argue that this is because Aristotle never intended to claim that virtue of character as a purely non-rational state. The appearance to the contrary is based on a misinterpretation of certain comments Aristotle makes early in the treatise, a misinterpretation that stems from failure adequately to appreciate the work’s somewhat unusual structure.
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